

Codebook for “Threats and Commitments: International Tribunals and Domestic Trials in Peace Negotiations”

Genevieve Bates

September 5, 2025

Contents

1	Identifier Variables	3
1.1	Country Name (<i>country</i>)	3
1.2	COW Code (<i>ccode</i>)	3
1.3	UCDP Conflict ID (<i>UcdpCon</i>)	3
1.4	PA-X Unique Agreement Identifier (<i>AgtID</i>)	3
1.5	Country has agreement in PA-X (<i>Agmt</i>)	3
1.6	Region (<i>region</i>)	3
1.7	Year (<i>year</i>)	3
1.8	Time (<i>time</i>)	3
1.9	Africa (<i>Africa</i>)	4
2	ICC Measures	4
2.1	Institutional ICC Threat (<i>threati</i>)	4
2.2	Intervention (<i>intervention</i>)	4
2.3	UN Security Council Referral (<i>unscref</i>)	4
2.4	Article 14 referral (<i>art14ref</i>)	4
2.5	Propio Motu Referral (<i>propmo</i>)	4
2.6	Stage of ICC Involvement (<i>stage</i>)	5
2.7	Extent of ICC Involvement (<i>extent</i>)	5
2.8	Minimalist ICC Threat (<i>threatm</i>)	5
2.9	Rome Statute Ratification (<i>ICC_ratification</i>)	5
2.10	Lagged Measures	5
2.10.1	Lagged Threat (<i>threatilag</i>)	5
2.10.2	Lagged Intervention (<i>interventionlag</i>)	6
2.10.3	Lagged Rome Statute Ratification (<i>lag_ICCrat</i>)	6
3	Economic Indicators	6
3.1	GDP Per Capita (<i>lag_loggdppc</i>)	6

3.2	Foreign Aid (<i>lag_odagni</i>)	6
4	Democracy and Justice System Indicators	6
4.1	Participatory Democracy (<i>v2x_partipdem</i>)	6
4.2	Access to Justice (<i>v2xcl_acjst</i>)	7
4.3	Lagged Measures	7
4.3.1	Lagged Participatory Democracy (<i>lag_partipdem</i>)	7
4.3.2	Lagged Access to Justice (<i>lag_acjst</i>)	7
5	Human Rights Organizations	7
5.1	HR Organizations (<i>hrfilled</i>)	7
5.2	Lagged Measures	8
5.2.1	Lagged HR Organizations (<i>lag_hrfilled</i>)	8
6	Conflict and Atrocity Measures	8
6.1	Combatant Casualties (<i>lag_casualties</i>)	8
6.2	Atrocities (<i>log_atrpost2002</i>)	8
6.3	Lagged Measures	9
6.3.1	Lagged Atrocities (<i>lag_atrpost2002</i>)	9
7	Peace Agreement Variables	9
7.1	Trial Commitment (<i>natcourts2</i>)	9
7.2	Trial Commitment - Alternative Measure (<i>natcourts</i>)	9
7.3	Trial Commitment - Conservative Measure (<i>natcourts3</i>)	9
7.4	Transitional Justice Commitment (<i>tj</i>)	10
7.5	IO Signature (<i>ic_UNOth</i>)	10

1 Identifier Variables

1.1 Country Name (*country*)

Name of country i .

1.2 COW Code (*ccode*)

Unique country identifier code, from the Correlates of War Project (COW Project 2017).

1.3 UCDP Conflict ID (*UcdpCon*)

Unique conflict ID number from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (Gleditsch, Wallensteen, Eriksson, Sollenberg & Strand 2002, Pettersson & Eck 2018).

1.4 PA-X Unique Agreement Identifier (*AgtID*)

Unique PA-X Peace Agreement Database and Dataset agreement ID number (Bell, Badanjak, Beujouan, Epple, Forster, Jamar, Molloy, McNicholl, Nash, Pospisil, Wilson, & Wise 2020).

1.5 Country has agreement in PA-X (*Agmt*)

An indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if country i has an agreement included in the PA-X Peace Agreement dataset. This was hand-coded.

1.6 Region (*region*)

The region in which country i is located. This takes the following values:

- Asia
- Africa
- Europe
- Americas
- Oceania

1.7 Year (*year*)

Year. In the “PanelData.RData” and “PanelData.csv” files, this is the year in the panel. In the “Analysis.RData” and “Analysis.csv” files, this is the year the agreement was signed.

1.8 Time (*time*)

A running count of the years since 2002 in the panel. This was hand-coded using the following calculation: $year - 2002 + 1$.

1.9 Africa (*Africa*)

This is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the country in question is located in Africa. This was hand coded using the “region” variable described in section 1.6.

2 ICC Measures

The following measures of ICC involvement and Rome Statute ratification were all the result of original data collection and hand-coding. As explained in section 2.9 and in the Appendix, some information was collected directly from the ICC website, while other information was collected from newspaper articles and secondary sources. An overview of coding decisions and the relevant underlying sources are included in the “ICCImpact-Coding.pdf” document elsewhere in the replication materials.

2.1 Institutional ICC Threat (*threati*)

Indicator variable that captures the institutional threat of intervention by the ICC. It takes the value of 1 for all years country i experiences the involvement from the ICC Prosecutor, beginning with the initiation of a preliminary examination and ending when an arrest warrant is issued. It otherwise takes the value 0.

2.2 Intervention (*intervention*)

Indicator variable that captures intervention by the ICC Prosecutor. It takes the value of 1 for all years after the ICC issues its first arrest warrant as part of an investigation in country i and continues until all cases are closed. It otherwise takes the value 0.

2.3 UN Security Council Referral (*unscref*)

Indicator of a UN Security Council referral of a situation in or relevant to country i to the ICC. It takes value of 1 in the year of the referral and continues until all cases are closed.

2.4 Article 14 referral (*art14ref*)

Indicator of an referral of a situation in or relevant to country i to the ICC, pursuant to Article 14 of the Rome Statute (a referral from a State Party to the Rome Statute). It takes value of 1 in the year of the referral and continues until all cases are closed.

2.5 Propio Motu Referral (*propmo*)

Indicator of an referral of a situation in or relevant to country i to the ICC, via the ICC Prosecutor’s *propio motu* authority. It takes value of 1 in the year of the beginning of the preliminary examination and continues until all cases are closed.

2.6 Stage of ICC Involvement (*stage*)

A categorical measure of the stage of ICC involvement in or pertaining to country i in year t . Country i is coded under each category the year the relevant stage begins and continues until the next stage begins or all cases are closed. The stages are listed as follows:

- ‘a’ = no ICC involvement,
- ‘prelim’ = preliminary examination,
- ‘formal’ = a formal investigation,
- ‘warrant’ = at least one arrest warrant has been issued,
- ‘trial’ = the beginning of a trial,
- ‘conviction’ = at least one conviction has occurred

2.7 Extent of ICC Involvement (*extent*)

An ordinal measure of the extent of ICC involvement in or pertaining to country i in year t . Country i is coded as each value the year the relevant stage begins and continues until the next level of involvement begins or all cases are closed. The values are listed as follows:

- 0 = no ICC involvement,
- 1 = preliminary examination,
- 2 = a formal investigation,
- 3 = at least one arrest warrant has been issued,
- 4 = the beginning of a trial,
- 5 = at least one conviction has occurred

2.8 Minimalist ICC Threat (*threatm*)

Indicator variable that captures the minimalist threat of intervention by the ICC. It takes the value of 1 for all years country i experiences the involvement from the ICC Prosecutor, beginning with the first public complaint made to the Prosecutor or first public statement made by the Prosecutor and ending when an arrest warrant is issued. It otherwise takes the value 0.

2.9 Rome Statute Ratification (*ICC_ratification*)

This is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if country i ratified the Rome Statute in year t , and takes the value of 0 otherwise. This data was collected from the ICC website at <https://asp.icc-cpi.int/states-parties> and hand coded for the country-years of the panel.

2.10 Lagged Measures

2.10.1 Lagged Threat (*threatilag*)

This measure lags the *threati* indicator variable by one year. For more information, see section 2.1 of this document.

2.10.2 Lagged Intervention (*interventionlag*)

This measure lags the *intervention* indicator variable by one year. For more information, see section 2.2 of this document.

2.10.3 Lagged Rome Statute Ratification (*lag_ICCrat*)

This measure lags the *ICC_ratification* indicator variable by one year. For more information, see section 2.9 of this document.

3 Economic Indicators

The following economic measures were collected from the World Bank’s *World Development Indicators* (WDI) Dataset. They were gathered using the “WDI” package in *R* and were transformed by lagging and/or logging the variable as outlined below (Arel-Bundock 2025).

3.1 GDP Per Capita (*lag_loggdppc*)

From the WDI’s “NY.GDP.PCAP.KD,” this is a measure of GDP per capita (constant 2000 US\$) in country *i* in year *t*. To produce the *lag_loggdppc* variable, the original measure was transformed by taking the natural log and lagging by one year. Missing values were calculated using linear interpolation.

3.2 Foreign Aid (*lag_odagni*)

From the WDI’s “DT.ODA.ODAT.GN.ZS,” this is a measure of the net ODA received (% of GNI) by country *i* in year *t*. To produce the *lag_odagni* variable, the original measure was transformed by lagging it by one year. Missing values were calculated using linear interpolation.

4 Democracy and Justice System Indicators

The following democracy and justice measures were collected from the *Varieties of Democracy* (VDem) Dataset, based on the VDem expert survey (Coppedge, Gerring, Knutsen, Lindberg, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Cornell, Fish, Gastaldi, Gjerlow, Glynn, Good God, Grahn, Hicken, Kinzelbach, Krusell, Marquardt, McMann, Mechkova, Medzihorsky, Paxton, Pemstein, Pernes, Rydén, von R omer, Seim, Sigman, Skaaning, Staton, Sundstr om, Tzelgov, Wang, Wig, Wilson & Ziblatt 2023). They can be gathered using the “vdem” package in *R*, but can also be downloaded directly from the VDem website at <https://www.v-dem.net/>.

4.1 Participatory Democracy (*v2x_partipdem*)

A continuous measure from 0-1 (low to high), the participatory democracy index comes from the VDem survey question that states “To what extent is the ideal of participatory democracy achieved?”

Clarification: The participatory principle of democracy emphasizes active participation by citizens in all political processes, electoral and non-electoral. It is motivated by uneasiness about a bedrock practice of electoral democracy: delegating authority to representatives. Thus, direct rule by citizens is preferred, wherever practicable. This model of democracy thus takes suffrage for granted, emphasizing engagement in civil society organizations, direct democracy, and subnational elected bodies. To make it a measure of participatory democracy, the index also takes the level of electoral democracy into account.” (Coppedge, Gerring, Knutsen, Lindberg, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Cornell, Fish, Gastaldi, Gjerlow, Glynn, Grahn, Hicken, Kinzelbach, Marquardt, McMann, Mechkova, Neundorf, Paxton, Pemstein, Rydén, von R omer, Seim, Sigman, Skaaning, Staton, Sundstr om, Tzelgov, Uberti, Wang, Wig & Ziblatt 2023, 45)

4.2 Access to Justice (*v2xcl_acjst*)

A continuous measure from 0-1 (low to high), the access to justice measure comes from the VDem survey question that states “Do citizens enjoy secure and effective access to justice?” (Coppedge, Gerring, Knutsen, Lindberg, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Cornell, Fish, Gastaldi, Gjerlow, Glynn, Grahn, Hicken, Kinzelbach, Marquardt, McMann, Mechkova, Neundorf, Paxton, Pemstein, Rydén, von R omer, Seim, Sigman, Skaaning, Staton, Sundstr om, Tzelgov, Uberti, Wang, Wig & Ziblatt 2023, 304)

4.3 Lagged Measures

4.3.1 Lagged Participatory Democracy (*lag_partipdem*)

This measure lags the *v2x_partipdem* variable by one year. For more information, see section 4.1 of this document.

4.3.2 Lagged Access to Justice (*lag_acjst*)

This measure lags the *v2xcl_acjst* variable by one year. For more information, see section 4.2 of this document.

5 Human Rights Organizations

The human rights organization presence data comes from Smith & Wiest (2005) and Murdie & Davis (2012).

5.1 HR Organizations (*hrfilled*)

This variable is the number of international NGOs (natural log) listed in the Yearbook of International Organizations with a human rights focus with members or volunteers in country *i* in year *t*. In line with Murdie & Davis (2012), missing values were calculated using linear interpolation.

5.2 Lagged Measures

5.2.1 Lagged HR Organizations (*lag_hrfilled*)

This measure lags the *hrfilled* variable by one year. For more information, see section 5.1 of this document.

6 Conflict and Atrocity Measures

The following conflict and atrocity measures were collected from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program’s *Georeferenced Events Dataset - Version 21.1* (GED), and were transformed by separating various measures of casualties and aggregating over time as outlined below (Sundberg & Melander 2013).

6.1 Combatant Casualties (*lag_casualties*)

This measure takes the natural log of the cumulative number of government casualties and the cumulative number of rebel casualties in country i in year t , as measured by the GED.

I calculate this aggregate measure by first merging the GED with the UCDP Armed Conflict Dataset - Version 21.1 (Gleditsch et al. 2002), and filter the conflict type to non-international armed conflict (type of conflict == 3 or 4) . I then further filter the dataset to only state-based conflict (type of violence == 1) and then calculate the cumulative sum of casualties suffered by side_a, which in state-based conflict is “always a government” (Stina 2021, 16). I then filter the GED dataset to state-based conflict (type of violence == 1) and calculate the cumulative sum of casualties suffered by side_b, which in state-based conflict is “always the rebel movement or rivaling government” (Stina 2021, 17). I construct the measure by calculating the sum of government and rebel casualties in country i in year t , then take the natural log of the sum before lagging it by one year.

6.2 Atrocities (*log_atrpost2002*)

This measure takes the natural log of the cumulative sum of the number of civilians that were subject to one-sided violence in country i from 2002 (when the Rome Statute went into effect) to year t , as measured by the GED.

I calculate this aggregate measure by first merging the GED with the UCDP Armed Conflict Dataset - Version 21.1 (Gleditsch et al. 2002), and filter the conflict type to non-international armed conflict (type of conflict == 3 or 4) . I then further filter the dataset to only state-based conflict (type of violence == 1) and then calculate the annual sum of casualties suffered by side_b when side_a is the government and side_b includes civilians. Note that according to the GED Dataset, side_b in “one-sided violence is always ‘civilians’” (Stina 2021, 17). I then calculate the annual sum of casualties suffered by side_b when side_a is not the government and side_b includes civilians. I take the annual sum of these measures as an overall annual measure of atrocities, or one-sided violence against civilians by either the government or another actor.

Next, I filter the year to 2002 or later to account for the ICC’s temporal jurisdiction, and then calculate the cumulative sum of atrocities committed in country i from 2002 to year t .¹ Finally I take the natural log of the atrocities measure.

6.3 Lagged Measures

6.3.1 Lagged Atrocities (*lag_atrpost2002*)

This measure lags the *lag_atrpost2002* variable by one year. For more information, see section 6.2 of this document.

7 Peace Agreement Variables

The following cross-sectional peace agreement variables were constructed from the PA-X Peace Agreement Database and Dataset, and were transformed for the purposes of this analysis (Bell & Badanjak 2017, Bell et al. 2020).

7.1 Trial Commitment (*natcourts2*)

An indicator variable for if the agreement includes a domestic trial commitment or an explicit prohibition of amnesty for certain crimes. To construct this variable, I took the *TjJaNc* measure from Bell et al. (2020), which includes “weak and rhetorical commitments,” “substantive commitments to deal with judicial accountability in national ... courts,” and “providing for strong commitments to deal with judicial accountability in national court that include detailed modalities” (65-6). I supplement this measure using PA-X’s *TjAmBan*, which is a binary variable that “takes the value of 1 if the peace agreement includes any provisions that place a ban/prohibition on amnesty” (Bell et al. 2020, 65). *Natcourts2* takes the value of 1 if *TjJaNc* = 1 or if *TjAmBan* = 1, and takes the value 0 otherwise.

7.2 Trial Commitment - Alternative Measure (*natcourts*)

An indicator variable for if the agreement includes a domestic trial commitment. To construct this variable, I took the *TjJaNc* measure from Bell et al. (2020), which includes “weak and rhetorical commitments,” “substantive commitments to deal with judicial accountability in national ... courts,” and “providing for strong commitments to deal with judicial accountability in national court that include detailed modalities” (65-6). *Natcourts* takes the value of 1 if *TjJaNc* = 1, and takes the value 0 otherwise.

7.3 Trial Commitment - Conservative Measure (*natcourts3*)

An indicator variable for if the agreement includes a strong domestic trial commitment. To construct this variable, I took the *TjCou* measure from Bell et al. (2020), which measures commitments to judicial accountability. The measure includes 4 categories:

¹The ICC cannot prosecute individuals for crimes committed prior to the Court’s establishment in 2002.

- 0 = no provision
- 1 = “weak and rhetorical commitments”
- 2 = “substantive commitments to deal with judicial accountability in national and international courts”
- 3 = “providing for strong commitments to deal with judicial accountability in national court that include detailed modalities” (Bell et al. 2020, 65)

Natcourts3 uses only the strongest commitment to judicial accountability, taking the value of 1 if *TJCou* = 3, and taking the value of 0 otherwise.

7.4 Transitional Justice Commitment (*tj*)

This binary indicator captures whether a peace agreement contains *any* provisions related to transitional justice. To construct this measure, I first use the following PA-X variables from Bell et al. (2020) to construct binary indicators of the presence of various TJ provisions:²

- TjAm - “any reference to amnesties or pardons, or similar” (64)
- TjJaNc - “any provisions dealing with judicial accountability in national courts” (66)
- TjJaIc - “any provisions dealing with judicial accountability in international courts” (66)
- TjMech - “Calls for or provides for a body other than one very specifically tailored to the other categories of some sort to ‘deal with the past’ ” (66)
- TjVet - “any mention of provisions for vetting and lustration processes”(67)
- TjRep - “any provision for reparations” (68)
- TjVic - “ any provisions specifically providing assistance to victims in these or other terms (e.g. those who have suffered to do with the conflict)” (67)

Tj then takes the value of 1 if any of the binary indicators of these provisions or commitments take the value of 1, and takes the value of 0 otherwise.

7.5 IO Signature (*ic_UNOth*)

This count indicator ranges from 0-2 and is an additive index of two indicators from the PA-X Dataset: *ImUN* and *ImOth*. *ImUN* “takes the value of 1 if the peace agreement includes any signature, in whatever capacity, of any UN official, or official of UN organizations (or in the case of unsigned declarations the UN is clearly one of the declaring parties),” while *ImOth* “takes the value of 1 if the peace agreement includes any signature, in whatever capacity, of any other international actor, state representative, or representative of an international organisation (e.g. AU)” (Bell et al. 2020, 69). The additive index, *ic_UNOth*, thus takes the following values:

- 0 = no signature
- 1 = either an UN signature or a signature from another international actor, state representative, or representative of an international organization

²Note that there are three categories of TJ included in the PA-X data that I do not include in this binary measure: prisoner release, measures to find or address the missing, and reconciliation.

2 = both a UN signature *and* a signature from another international actor, state representative, or representative of an international organization

References

- Arel-Bundock, Vincent. 2025. *WDI: World Development Indicators and Other World Bank Data*. R package version 2.7.9.
URL: <https://vincentarelbundock.github.io/WDI/>
- Bell, Christine & Sanja Badanjak. 2017. “Introducing PA-X: A new peace agreement database and dataset.” *Journal of Peace Research* .
- Bell, Christine, Sanja Badanjak, Juline Beujouan, Tim Epple, Robert Forster, Astrid Jamar, Sean Molloy, Kevin McNicholl, Kathryn Nash, Jan Pospisil, Robert Wilson, & Laura Wise. 2020. *PA-X Codebook, Version 3*. Political Settlements Research Programme.
URL: www.peaceagreements.org
- Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, Agnes Cornell, M. Steven Fish, Lisa Gastaldi, Haakon Gjerlow, Adam Glynn, Ana Good God, Sandra Grahn, Allen Hicken, Katrin Kinzelbach, Joshua Krusell, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Juraj Medzihorsky, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Josefine Pernes, Oskar Rydén, Johannes von R omer, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jeffrey Staton, Aksel Sundstr om, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, Steven Wilson & Daniel Ziblatt. 2023. “V-Dem Country-Year Dataset v13.”
- Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, Agnes Cornell, M. Steven Fish, Lisa Gastaldi, Haakon Gjerlow, Adam Glynn, Sandra Grahn, Allen Hicken, Katrin Kinzelbach, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Anja Neundorf, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Oskar Rydén, Johannes von R omer, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jeffrey Staton, Aksel Sundstr om, Eitan Tzelgov, Luca Uberti, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig & Daniel Ziblatt. 2023. “V-Dem Codebook v13.” *Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project* .
- COW Project. 2017. “State System Membership List, v2016.”
URL: <https://correlatesofwar.org/data-sets>
- Gleditsch, Nils Petter, Peter Wallensteen, Mikael Eriksson, Margareta Sollenberg & Håvard Strand. 2002. “Armed conflict 1946-2001: A new dataset.” *Journal of peace research* 39(5):615–637.
- Murdie, Amanda M & David R Davis. 2012. “Shaming and blaming: Using events data to assess the impact of human rights INGOs.” *International Studies Quarterly* 56(1):1–16.
- Pettersson, Therése & Kristine Eck. 2018. “Organized violence, 1989–2017.” *Journal of Peace Research* 55(4):535–547.

Smith, Jackie & Dawn Wiest. 2005. "The uneven geography of global civil society: National and global influences on transnational association." *Social Forces* 84(2):621–652.

Stina, Hogbladh. 2021. "UCDP GED Codebook version 21.1."

URL: <https://correlatesofwar.org/data-sets>

Sundberg, Ralph & Erik Melander. 2013. "Introducing the UCDP georeferenced event dataset." *Journal of peace research* 50(4):523–532.